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incorporates both observed heterogeneity and measurement error in wages.  Using the model to
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leads to an increase of R660 in mean accepted wages and a decrease of 15 percentage points in the
share of youth experiencing long-term unemployment.
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Unemployment among the young in South Africa is stunningly high and frustratingly persistent.
Using the narrow ILO denition of unemployment which requires one to have actively sought work
in the past four weeks, unemployment among 20-24 year olds exceeds 50 percent. These rates have
persisted for over a decade.1 One policy response being actively considered is an employer wage
subsidy for young workers. In this paper, we prospectively analyze such a policy for the Cape Town
metro area.
Any analysis of a wage subsidy must be embedded in a model that generates equilibrium unem-
ployment, given the magnitude and persistence of South African youth unemployment. Accordingly,
we estimate a structural job search model in which reservation wages play a prominent role. In our
model, an individual's reservation wage is an optimal response to labor market frictions that gen-
erate equilibrium unemployment. We then use our model to analyze the impact of a wage subsidy.
Intuitively, the reservation wage is that which leaves an individual indierent between accepting
a job today and continuing to search. In this dynamic model, a wage subsidy increases both the
value of search and the value of employment resulting in a higher reservation wage. The impact of
a wage subsidy in this context is nuanced.
The paper's contributions are two-fold. On the policy front, the paper analyzes the ecacy
of a wage subsidy to Cape Town youth. We nd that while a wage subsidy does lead youth to
increase their reservation wages, they do so by a modest amount so the subsidy increases accepted
wages and reduces the probability of lengthy unemployment spells. Specically, we nd that a
R1000/month wage subsidy paid to employers leads to an increase of R660 in mean accepted wages
and a decrease of 15 percentage points in the share of youth experiencing long-term unemployment.
On the methodological front, the paper is the rst to apply data on reservation wages from a
developing country to estimate a structural search model. Our model incorporates measurement
error in reported wages and observed heterogeneity in the structural parameters.
The paper is also part of an extensive literature on unemployment in South Africa. For our
1See (Banerjee, Galiani, Levinsohn, McLaren and Woolard 2008) for the exact gures and for a discussion of the
causes behind the post-apartheid increase in unemployment.
1purposes, the most relevant is the recent literature on search and reservation wages in Cape Town.
Using the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS), which we also use in this paper, Lam, Leibbrandt and
Mlatsheni (2009) document the lengthy unemployment spells faced by Cape Town youth who exit
school. Nattrass and Walker (2005) analyze data from the Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain (KMP)
survey conducted in 2000-2001, which sampled working-age adults from a Cape Town working-
class district. Using the same KMP data, Schoer and Leibbrandt (2006) nd that several dierent
search strategies prevail in the data. An employer-based wage subsidy for youth in South Africa
is discussed in Pauw and Edwards (2006), Levinsohn (2008), Go, Kearney, Korman, Robinson and
Thierfelder (2010), and Burns, Edwards and Pauw (2010).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section presents the model and
discusses its estimation and identication. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents
results of the search model. Section 5 presents results of the policy simulation of an employer wage
subsidy. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model, Estimation and Identication
2.1 Model and Estimation
To use the terminology of Eckstein and Berg (2007), our model is a standard \classical job search"
model. It is a partial equilibrium model in that it models only the worker's optimal search policy in
a dynamic setting, leaving the rm's behavior as exogenous; and it is a \wage posting" model in that
rms post wages which potential workers must either accept or reject (in contrast to \bargaining"
models, in which workers and rms bargain over the wage after a match has been made). Flinn
and Heckman (1982) provide an extensive discussion of parameter identication in such models.
Christensen and Kiefer (1991) present a model of this type that is quite similar to ours, develop
its likelihood function, and discuss parameter identication. Our model follows Wolpin (1987) and
Eckstein and Wolpin (1995) in its focus on the transition from school to work, and is among the
small number of papers (such as Lancaster and Chesher 1983, Lynch 1983, Berg 1990) to use survey
data on the reservation wage in a structurally estimated search model.
2We consider the innite-horizon, continuous-time dynamic programming problem of an unem-
ployed worker searching for a job, who faces a known wage oer distribution with cumulative
distribution function FW(w) and Poisson job oer arrival rate q. When unemployed, the searcher's
ow value of leisure2 is b and she/he discounts the future by discount factor . If accepted, a job
pays constant wage w, but the worker faces an exogenous probability of job separation p. Once
rejected, wage oers may not be recalled. The corresponding continuous-time Bellman equations
for the value of search and employment (V s and V e, respectively) are:
(1   )V s = b + qE[maxf0;V e(w0)   V sg] (1)
(1   )V e(w) = w + p[V s   V e(w)] (2)
where w0 denotes a future draw from FW. The reservation wage w makes the agent indierent
between accepting the job oer and continued search, i.e., it solves: V e(w) = V s. Manipulation
of the above Bellman equations lead to the following standard expression for the reservation wage
w:
w = b +
q
(1   ) + p
Z 1
w
(w   w)dFW(w) (3)
Given values of b, , p and the parameters characterizing FW, one may solve for w through policy
function iteration using the above.
Note that this formulation does not explicitly account for two institutional features of the
broader South African labor market: minimum wages and union wage-setting. With respect to the
former, several studies have found low enforcement of minimum wages in South Africa (Hertz 2005,
Yamada 2007, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 2010). With respect to the latter, in our sample only 2
percent of employed respondents report being union members (CAPS, Wave 2).3 To the extent
that both of these features impact the distribution of wage oers and the job arrival rate, they are
2The ow value of leisure may also be viewed as the net search cost. In this paper, we will use the terms \ow
value of leisure," \net search cost," and \search cost" interchangeably. All refer to the model parameter b.
3See Magruder (2010) for a discussion of the extended consequences bargaining councils on wage setting.
3implicit in (3).
The model implies a joint distribution of accepted wages and unemployment durations, f(w;djw 
w), which will form the basis of the likelihood function and whose parameters we seek to recover.
Since the model assumes that oer arrivals are independent of wage draws, this joint distribution
may be factored as the product of the marginal distributions of accepted wages and unemploy-
ment durations, leaving us with f(w;djw  w) = fW(wjw  w)  fD(djw  w). We consider
estimation of each in turn.
According to the model, no agent accepts a wage below the reservation wage, allowing us to use
the truncation of the wage distribution from below at w to recover the parameters of the wage oer
distribution, since fW(wjw  w) =
fW(w)
1 FW(w). In practice, however, wages are measured with error,
so that some reported wages may fall below the reservation wage. Suppose classical measurement
error, such that wo = w + , where wo denotes observed wages and   N(0;2
) is independent
of w. Although the support of the measurement error distribution is unbounded, we may bound
realized draws of  by noting that no true accepted wage may fall below w, i.e., Pr(w < w) = 0.4
Therefore we have:
w = wo     w ,
  wo   w    (4)
The corresponding density of observed wages is:









where () is the standard normal density.5
4This approach to bounding the measurement error distribution follows Christensen and Kiefer (1994), although
they do not assume that the measurement error is normally distributed, as we do.
5Allowing instead for measurement error in reservation wages rather than accepted wages would not change the
results of our model. To see this, suppose (without loss of generality) that reservation wages are measured with error,
such that w
o = w   , where w
o is the observed reservation wage and  is distributed N(0;2
), as above. Then we
would have:
4Now consider the density of unemployment durations, fD(d). Under the assumption of Poisson
oer arrivals, the hazard rate of unemployment exit, h, is a (constant) product of the oer arrival
rate and the probability that a wage draw exceeds the reservation wage, i.e., h = q(1   FW(w)).
Accordingly, unemployment durations are distributed exponentially with parameter h, so that
fD(d) = hexp( hd). In practice, however, some unemployment spells will be right-censored,
so that observed duration d = minfd;dcg, where d is the true duration and dc is the duration
observed when the spell was censored. Let c = Ifd = dcg be an indicator for censored spells. Then
the density of observed unemployment durations, gD(d), is:
gD(d) = fD(d)1 c[1   FD(d)]c (6)
We observe a sample of accepted wages and (possibly right-censored) unemployment durations.
By denition, we do not observe accepted wages for those with right-censored durations, and an
additional subset of observations with completed unemployment spells may also have missing wage
data. Let m = f0;1g be an indicator for missing wage data. Therefore, the vector of observed data




(1   mi)lnfW(woijwi  w;) + lngD(di;) (7)
We estimate (7) using quasi-Newton techniques, with starting values chosen from initial esti-
mates obtained from separate, preliminary estimation of the observed wage and unemployment
duration distributions. We parameterize the wage oer distribution as exponential with parameter
, so that the model parameters estimated by the likelihood function are  = (q;;).7 Note that
w  w = w
o +  ,
w   w
o     
This leads to the same upper bound on , and thus the same accepted wage density as the case with measurement
error in wages. The only dierence would arise in the interpretation of the placement of the measurement error, but
estimation results would be identical.
6Appendix A describes the derivation and form of the likelihood function in greater detail.
7To restrict our estimated parameters to the positive domain, as implied by theory, we actually estimate each
parameter as exponentiated functions of observable characteristics, e.g., q = exp(0X).
5the parameters (b;;p) of the theoretical model are not identied by the likelihood function. We
describe estimation of the reservation wage w in the following subsection.
2.2 Identication
Identication of the model parameters depends crucially on the reservation wage. In addition to
determining the policy function of the theoretical search model, the reservation wage plays a key
role in empirical parameter identication in the likelihood function. By providing the truncation
point of the accepted wage distribution, the reservation wage, in conjunction with the dispersion of
accepted wages around it, serves to identify the underlying wage oer distribution. Additionally, its
role in truncating the accepted wage distribution helps to identify the measurement error variance by
placing an upper bound on the measurement error for all observed wages. Moreover, by entering into
the expression for the hazard rate of unemployment exit, the reservation wage helps to identify the
oer arrival rate by reconciling variation in observed unemployment durations with the probability
of oer acceptance.
We estimate the preferred version of the model using survey data on the reservation wage.
Because the CAPS data has the rare advantage of self-reported reservation wages, we use the
median reservation wage (within cells dened by included covariates) as model inputs. The median
reservation wage, rather than individual reservation wage reports, is used because under the model
all agents face identical structural parameters and therefore must have an identical reservation
wage.8
However, for comparative purposes, we also estimate the model under alternative measures of
the reservation wage, and report how results change under each. Under the model assumptions,
the minimum accepted wage in the data is a consistent estimator of the reservation wage (Flinn
and Heckman 1982). However, under the assumption that wages are measured with error, this
estimator will be susceptible to outliers in the left tail of the observed wage distribution, so instead
we use the 5th percentile of observed wages, which is also a consistent estimator of the reservation
8We could also choose the mean reservation wage or other measure of central tendency, but chose the median
because it is less sensitive to outliers. Parameter estimates obtained using mean reservation wages are qualitatively
similar to those obtained under the median.
6wage (Flinn and Heckman 1982, Eckstein and Berg 2007).9
The theoretical model also provides a means to identify the reservation wage in a manner that
is fully structural. Actually doing so in practice, though, is typically problematic. This is because
the reservation wage is a boundary value (since it is the truncation point of the accepted wage
distribution) so it cannot be estimated by maximum likelihood.10 However, because our model
assumes that measurement error in the reservation wage may lead some observed wages to fall
below the reservation wage, the boundary value problem is eliminated, and the reservation wage
may indeed be estimated as an additional model parameter in a conventional maximum likelihood
framework.
3 Data
We use data from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS), a longitudinal study of youth in metropolitan
Cape Town, South Africa (Lam, Ardington, Branson, Case, Leibbrandt, Menendez, Seekings and
Sparks 2008). CAPS sampled about 4,800 youth aged 14-22 in Wave 1 (August-December 2002)
and currently contains four waves, the most recent conducted in 2006. For our purposes, the most
relevant features of the data are its monthly histories (for a period of 52 months from 2002-2006) of
education, search and employment activity, as well as its questions on reservation wages. We focus
only on those youth who have left school,11 are observed for at least 12 months in the calendar
sample, and have a valid response to the reservation wage question. Additionally, those outside
the 1st and 99th percentiles of the accepted wage distribution are dropped to limit the inuence
of outliers in the estimation. This leaves N = 1;430 individuals in the sample. Key variables are
described in Appendix B.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample. Among the notable features are the
high durations and rates of unemployment: mean duration to rst job since school exit is nearly
9Flinn and Heckman (1982) and Eckstein and Berg (2007) note that any xed order statistic of the accepted wage
distribution consistently estimates w.
10Identication in this case requires specifying b, , and p which are not identied by the likelihood function.
11We dene school exit as being out of school for at least 3 consecutive months. A related paper, Pugatch (2011)
uses this data to investigate school re-enrollment.
712 months, while 42% of the sample is unemployed for at least one year. Observed search behavior
appears low with 35% never searching since leaving school. Nonetheless, few youth are returning to
school: only 6% report returning to school before obtaining their rst job (or censoring), and none
returned to school full-time (i.e., all report searching or working concurrently with re-enrollment
in school). Of those who nd work, most (77%) are employed full-time.12 Unlike many African
economies, South Africa does not have a substantial informal sector. The mean accepted wage was
2486 rand and wages are measured in real South African rand per month (base month August 2002,
at which time the South African rand/US dollar exchange rate was 10.59). Table 1 appears quite
consistent, at least on the surface, with a reservation wage story in which school leavers wait for a
full-time, reasonably well-compensated job.
Table 2 presents unemployment durations and rates by observable characteristics. The data
reveal expected patterns: unemployment is more prevalent and prolonged for coloureds and blacks,
females, the young, and the low-skilled (both in terms of low schooling and low ability). The levels
can be quite striking, however, even for the most advantaged groups: 21% of whites and 15% of
those with at least some post-secondary education are unemployed for at least one year since school
exit, for instance. Another surprising result is the post-school labor market experience of those
who report never searching: of this group, only 36% are censored, meaning that the remaining
64% obtain a job, despite reporting to never have searched. This suggests that \search," at least as
understood by the survey respondents, is not necessary to obtain employment, and thus many youth
who may appear to be non-participants in the labor market may in fact be searching passively, or
at least prepared to accept a job should an acceptable oer arrive.13
Because reservation wages play a key role in our model, we further investigate the quality of the
reservation wage data. Our reservation wage measure is the minimum monthly wage for which the
youth reported to be willing to accept full-time work, measured at the latest wave prior to obtaining
a job after permanent school exit (or censoring).14 Table 1 showed that 24% of those with completed
12Our model results are qualitatively similar when excluding part-time workers from the sample.
13Our denition of \never searched" excludes those who report obtaining employment immediately after leaving
school. Although such youth do not report searching between school exit and employment, we expect that many
in fact did actively search for work prior to obtaining work, and therefore exclude them from the \never searched"
group so as not to bias results.
14Appendix B contains additional details on the construction of the reservation wage measure.
8spells and non-missing wage data report reservation wages that exceed their reported wage; Figure
1 is a graphical depiction of the same, with points below the 45-degree line indicating observations
for which w > w. The model accounts for this phenomenon by estimating the distribution of
measurement error in wages. Table 3 presents regressions of the reservation wage on a set of
observable characteristics. Although few coecients are statistically signicant, they generally
enter with the expected sign: reservation wages are lower among females, blacks and coloureds,
who likely face more labor market disadvantages than similarly-skilled males and whites; lower
(convexly) as a function of age, suggesting that older youth are less patient in their search; higher
for the more skilled, as proxied by schooling and ability; higher for those with employed fathers or
with co-resident parents, likely due to the greater availability of intra-household transfers; lower for
those whose parents want them more strongly to work; and lower for those with their own children
in the household, who have greater need to accept paid work. A notable exception is the negative
coecient on pension receipt by a household member, which contradicts the conventional wisdom
that availability of pension-related resources increases reservation wages, although the coecient is
signicant only at the 10% level. The regression results suggest that, despite some discrepancies
between observed wages and reservation wages, the reservation wage data from the survey are
generally internally consistent when considering correlations with observable attributes.
An assumption of our model is a constant arrival rate for job oers which (in combination with
the assumption that all other structural parameters are time-invariant) implies that the reservation
wage is constant. Because CAPS asks about reservation wages in each wave of the panel, we can
test whether an individual's reservation wage is constant or whether it declines with unemployment
duration. We do so by regressing the reservation wage on unemployment duration with individual-
level xed eects to account for time-invariant individual heterogeneity, and we nd no evidence
of declining reservation wages. We conclude that the assumption of constant reservation wages is
plausible.15
15This is convenient since the leading methods for incorporating time-varying reservation wages in structurally
estimated search models make assumptions that do not t the South African context: assuming a nite search
horizon (as in Wolpin 1987) seems unsuited to youth seeking their rst job following school exit, and allowing
structural parameters (typically the unemployment benet, as in Berg 1990) to evolve over time in a known fashion
is at odds with the South African experience.
9Finally, we consider the adequacy of our distributional assumptions used to form the likelihood
function. Figure 2 shows kernel density estimates of accepted wages and rst unemployment spells,
respectively; recall that both distributions are assumed exponential for purposes of estimation.16
Although the empirical distributions from the full sample may mask considerable heterogeneity and
thus can not show that our distributional assumptions are correct, observable patterns consistent
with the exponential distribution (e.g., monotonically decreasing with a long right tail) at least
suggest that our estimates may t the data well. The accepted wage distribution, panel [a], does
exhibit the left tail mode and long right tail that is characteristic of the exponential distribution;
in our model, measurement error may account for the increasing density in the far left tail. The
unemployment duration density (for completed spells; panel [b] also exhibits these patterns, and
appears to be consistent with our assumption of a constant hazard rate of unemployment exit, in
the aggregate.17
4 Model Parameter Estimates
In this section, we discuss the parameter estimates of the structural model that we next use to
analyze the wage subsidy. Recall the key parameters governing the model are q (the job oer
arrival rate),  (the wage oer), and  (the standard deviation of the measurement error). We
incorporate observed heterogeneity by modeling the job arrival rate and the wage oer as log linear
functions of a parsimonious set of covariates: indicator variables for black, coloured, high school
graduate, at least some college, high ability,18 and previous work experience; the omitted group is
low-ability whites with less than a high school education and no previous work experience. The
measurement error variance is estimated as a single parameter for the entire sample, however.19
16Under exponential wage oers, the density of accepted wages will also be exponential, with a rightward shift of
the oer distribution by the amount of the reservation wage.
17Although the kernel density is increasing in the far left tail, the empirical mode is 1 month (the minimum allowed,
by assumption), so the empirical density does have its mode at the left tail of the distribution.
18We dene \high ability" as above the median literacy and numeracy evaluation score within the estimation
sample.
19Although in principle we could have treated the measurement error as heteroskedastic by allowing its variance
to vary according to observable characteristics, in practice the measurement error coecients were rarely signicant
in such models, and frequently led to numerical instability in the parameter estimates.
10As noted above, the reservation wage plays a key role in identication of the model. We in-
corporate the reservation wage into our model rst in a base case approach and then using two
alternative approaches.
4.1 Base Case Estimates
In the base case, we estimate (7) using the median reservation wage within cells dened by the
included covariates as our measure of w. Results are presented in Table 4.
Results for q, the job oer arrival rate, are given in the rst column. The \baseline level"
reported in the rst row is the exponentiated value of the constant term, and may be interpreted
as the monthly probability of receiving a job oer for the omitted group.20 The baseline monthly
probability of a job oer is 27%. The reported coecients on lnq represent the marginal eect, in
log points, on the oer arrival rate. We see that blacks and coloureds face oer arrival rates that are
.8 and .4 log points (or approximately 80% and 40%) lower, respectively, than those for whites. High
school graduation and post-secondary schooling generate large returns on oer arrivals (coecients
of .48 and .69, respectively), while high ability and previous work experience also increase the oer
arrival rate considerably (coecients of .27 and .37, respectively). The estimates imply that a black,
low-ability high school dropout with no previous work experience has a monthly oer probability
of just 12%, but that high ability, previous work experience and some college education nearly
quadruple this probability, to 46%.
Results for , the wage oer distribution parameter, whose baseline represents the mean (and
standard deviation) of the wage oer distribution are given in the second column. Coecients are
marginal eects in log points, as before. The estimated baseline wage oer, at R710, is quite low
relative to the mean accepted wage of R2,486.21 Not surprisingly, the model predicts that only
29% of wage oers are accepted.22 As with the oer arrival rate, the estimates imply considerable
20When the estimate exceeds unity, the parameter may also be interpreted as the predicted number of job oers
per month.
21Such a comparison must be interpreted with caution, however, as the baseline wage oer is for the omitted
category of white, low ability high school dropouts without previous work experience, while the mean accepted wage
is for the full sample.
22We calculate the probability of oer acceptance, Pr(w  w), as the mean over the distribution of the full sample,
i.e., Pr(w  w) =
R
Pr(w  wjx)f(x)dx.
11labor market disadvantages for black and coloured youth (coecients -.32 and -.13, respectively).
Schooling, ability and previous work experience generate large returns, however, with the coecient
of .73 on previous work experience particularly notable (although this coecient may be picking
up a number of omitted factors that are correlated with experience, such as motivation or access
to employment networks). Comparing model estimates again for black, low-ability high school
dropouts with no previous work experience to their high ability, college-educated and experienced
counterparts, we nd that the former face a mean wage oer of R513, while the latter receives oers
more than four times as large, at R2,113. The estimated measurement error standard deviation, ,
implies that measurement error accounts for 27% of the standard deviation in accepted wages.23
4.2 Estimates with Alternative Measures of the Reservation Wage
The base case approach above used within-cell median reported reservation wages as the measure
of w. Reported reservation wage data, though, are rare. In this section, we estimate the model
using two alternative measures of the reservation wage that do not require reported reservation
wages. First, we use the fth percentile of accepted wages (by cell), denoted wq5 as our measure
of the reservation wage. We next estimate the model leaving the reservation wage as a parameter
to be estimated as described in the last paragraph of section 2.2. We denote this measure as
w
MLE.24 Estimating the model with these alternative measures of the reservation wage serves
two purposes. It allows us to infer the \value-added" of having data on actual reservation wages.
Usually, reservation wages have to be inferred (or estimated). By comparing estimates with actual
reservation wages to those without, we highlight the role that the reservation wage data play. It
also allows us to investigate how the impact of the wage subsidy varies depending on which measure
of the reservation wage is used.
Table 5 presents parameter estimates for each alternative. The rst column repeats the base case
estimates for comparison while column 2 reports results with wq5 and column 3 reports estimates
23Bound and Krueger (1991) found that measurement error accounts for 18% of the variance in reported annual
earnings for men in the US.
24In the estimation, w
MLE is restricted to be w =  w   , corresponding to the truncation of the exponential
accepted wage distribution at w.
12with w
MLE. We nd that results are qualitatively similar regardless of the measure of the reservation
wage used with expected signs on all coecients.
Turning rst to results for q, the job oer arrival rate, we see that baseline oer arrivals are
estimated to be more frequent with the actual reservation wage data, w, than is the case when we
use inferred or estimated reservation wages: a monthly job oer probability of .27, versus .07 and
.15 under wq5 and w
MLE, respectively. Although the dierences between the models shrinks for
some groups when coecients are factored in, the generally higher oer arrival rates of column (1)
are consistent with higher reservation wages under w: youth who face more frequent oers will be
more selective about which to accept.
Dierences between the models' estimates of , the wage oer distribution parameter, are also
quite striking. The baseline mean wage oer of R1,445 in the model with wq5 (Table 5, column 2) is
more than double that of the model with w. The baseline oer of R899 in the model with w
MLE
(column 3), while not nearly as high, still exceeds the baseline under w by more than 20%. Again,
certain coecients mitigate these dierences somewhat, but the generally lower level of wage oers
in the model with w comes through clearly in the estimated probabilities of oer acceptance: 29%
under w, versus 59% and 44% under wq5 and w
MLE, respectively.
Considered in conjunction with the oer arrival rate results, the estimates oer a contrasting
picture of the labor market: under w, wage oers are relatively frequent but low, while under wq5
oers are infrequent but high. This arrival/wage oer tradeo is how the model reconciles dierent
reservation wages using the same data on unemployment durations and accepted wages. Accord-
ingly, the probability of oer acceptance (Pr(w  w)) implied by the models suggest that if youth
behave according to their reservation wage reports, they are less than half as likely to accept a wage
oer than under wq5; we will return to this discrepancy and suggest possible explanations shortly.
Results for the model with w
MLE fall somewhere in between the other two, with intermediate oer
arrivals and wage oers for most subgroups, as may be expected when we \let the data speak" to
nd the best t.
The estimated measurement error standard deviation, , is greatest in the model with w and
smallest in the model with wq5. This is unsurprising: recall that the measurement error parameter
13serves to reconcile the density of observed wages below the reservation wage, and hence should be
largest in the model with w, since reservation wages are highest (on average) in that case.
Finally, the coecients on w
MLE in column (3) follow the expected pattern: black and coloured
youth have lower reservation wages relative to whites, while reservation wages are increasing in
schooling and ability. Interestingly, the negative coecient on previous work experience suggests
that youth who have already engaged in paid work are willing to work for less than their inexperi-
enced peers, although this coecient is imprecisely estimated.
The relatively frequent oer arrivals and low job acceptance probability in the model with w
begs the question, \If the South African youth labor market is so bad, why are youth turning down
so many jobs?" Our answer is that it is unlikely that youth are actually receiving, and refusing, job
oers with the frequency implied by our estimates. Instead, we consider it more likely that low-wage
jobs are more abundant than the unemployment data may suggest, but such low-wage matches are
made infrequently. \Search" is not necessarily an active process for this group, as the 64% of our
sample who obtained employment without ever reporting search activity suggests. Thus the high
frequency of oer arrivals and refusals we estimate are more likely to represent \implicit refusals"
of low-wage oers that are available in principle, but that are not literally made by employers to
unemployed youth. The matching costs incurred by both sides may exceed the surplus generated
by these low-wage matches.
4.3 Model Fit
The structural search model generates predictions for the distributions of unemployment durations
and accepted wages. Before considering a formal Lagrange Multiplier test, we rst oer a more
qualitative comparison of the predicted distributions and their empirical counterparts.
We rst consider the distribution of unemployment durations till obtaining the rst job. Because
some durations are right-censored, it will be convenient to work with the survivor function for
unemployment, or the probability that an unemployment spell d exceeds some value d0 (i.e., S(d0) =
Pr(d  d0)). Table 6 shows, in column (1), the empirical survivor function at various monthly
durations, along with model estimates depending on how the reservation was is treated in columns
14(2)-(4). For example, 69 percent of actual unemployment spells exceed 3 months while the model,
for each treatment of the reservation wage, predicts that 75 percent of the spells would exceed 3
months. The model almost exactly predicts the fraction of spells exceeding 12 months (42 percent)
and over-predicts the fraction of spells lasting 24 and 36 months.
We next consider the distribution of accepted wages in Table 7. The model predicts the mean
of the accepted wage distribution pretty well. The actual mean is R2486 while, when we use the
reported reservation wages, w, the model predicts a mean accepted wage of R2346. The model,
though, underestimates the standard deviation of the distribution of accepted wages, and this is
seen by comparing actual and predicted accepted wages at dierent parts of the distribution. The
empirical distribution has a longer right tail than that predicted by the model, and this explains
the dierences in the mean and standard deviation reported in the top two rows of the table.
We conclude from our qualitative evaluation of model t that the model does fairly well for
most of the mass of the distributions but does less well in the right tails. That is, the model does
not t the really long unemployment durations or really high accepted wages very well. At some
level, this is unsurprising. The model is quite simple and it is asking a lot to t the far right tail of
the distributions of unemployment duration and accepted wages.
We test the model more formally by conducting Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests.25 This test
essentially asks whether moments of the distributions predicted by model match their empirical
counterparts. The LM test is similar in spirit to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test{a nonparametric
test for the equality of two distributions. Results are given in the bottom panels of tables 6 and
7. We consistently reject the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specied. This too is
unsurprising given the simplicity of the model and the high bar set by a test that is, in essence,
comparing entire distributions of outcomes.
25Appendix C describes details of these tests.
155 Analysis of a Youth Wage Subsidy
5.1 The impacts of a wage subsidy
Having estimated a structural search model consistent with the observed distributions of unem-
ployment and accepted wages, we now use this model to prospectively analyze the impact of a wage
subsidy to youth in the Cape Town area.
As government in South Africa contemplates responses to youth unemployment, a wage subsidy
is being actively considered. In his 2010 budget speech, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan stated:26
Many South Africans, speaking of their own experiences on the streets of our cities,
at factory gates and in rural communities, have urged us to take steps to make it
easier for young people to nd work. Labour market data conrm that employers are
reluctant to hire inexperienced work-seekers, while school-leavers lack basic workplace
competencies. Furthermore, our bargaining arrangements push up entry level wages,
pricing out inexperienced work-seekers.
Under the leadership of the Department of Labour, initiatives are in progress to improve
information services to help young people access jobs and training opportunities. We
propose to support these reforms through a subsidy to employers that will lower the
cost of hiring young people without work experience.
The impact of a wage subsidy will depend on its level, of course, but also on how individuals
respond to the subsidy. Intuitively, the subsidy shifts the wage oer distribution to the right and
the bigger the subsidy, the bigger the shift. Knowing that expected wage oers will be higher,
individuals increase their reservation wages (see eq. (3)). In the new equilibrium, the probability
of accepting a job oer increases as does the mean accepted wage. Correspondingly, unemployment
spells are shortened. The magnitude of these responses, though, is an empirical question.
We model the wage subsidy as a shift right in the wage oer distribution by the full amount
of the subsidy, s. Hence the entire distribution, including the truncation point, shifts by s. This
approach implicitly assumes that the subsidy is fully passed through to job seekers in the form of
wage oers. In this sense, this is a best-case scenario for the impact of the subsidy, since to the
extent that employers have some market power in the youth labor market, pass-through will not
be complete.
26The entire National Budget Speech is found at Gordhan (2010).
16The rst step of simulating the impact of a wage subsidy is to compute the new reservation
wage. In our model, a change in the wage oer mean (or any structural parameter) will change w,
and hence the simulation results will depend crucially on how the model accounts for the agent's
updated w in response to the policy change. When w is estimated structurally, the approach is
straightforward: merely update the structural estimate of w under the new wage oer distribution.
However, when w is estimated from individuals' reported reservation wages as in our analysis, we
must update w by calibrating some elements of  that we did not observe (or estimate) in our
baseline specication. We update w in a fashion that is consistent with our search model, as
expressed in (3). Specically, we use our maximum likelihood estimates of (;q) and calibrate the
model parameters not estimated by our model (b,,p) such that they reproduce the value of w
used in the baseline (no subsidy) estimation. We calibrate p according to observed job separations
in the data; choose  = :95 annually; and then choose b to match w to the data (by inverting the
reservation wage function). We then update w by varying the subsidy value s, holding all other
parameters xed.
Results of this exercise are given in the top panel of Figure 3. That panel shows the new
reservation wage and how it varies depending on the level of the subsidy.27 The subsidy s = 0
corresponds to the baseline estimates discussed in the preceding sections, and s increases to R1,000
in increments of 100 along the horizontal axis. (To put the size of the subsidy in context, note
that the mean wage in the sample is about R2486.) The top panel shows that the reservation
wage increases monotonically with the subsidy and that the relationship is close to linear. A R1000
subsidy increases the reservation wage by about R660 and, while the level of the reservation wage
depends on how it is estimated, the response of the reservation wage to a subsidy is about the same
for each treatment of the reservation wage.
The higher reservation wages that result from the introduction of the wage subsidy result in
higher accepted wages. The bottom panel of Figure 3 displays these results. Again, the relationship
between the mean accepted wage and the subsidy is about linear and that relationship is fairly
invariant to the way that reservation wages are treated in the estimation. A R1000 subsidy increases
27In Figures 3-5, the lines labeled wrhat=wr correspond to the model estimated with w; wrhat=wp5 to wq5; and
wrhat=wrmle to w
MLE.
17the mean accepted wage by about R660 (and recall this is assuming that the subsidy is fully passed
through to the wage oer distribution).28 Hence, only about 66% of the wage subsidy shows up
as an increase in the mean accepted wage. Of course, the wage subsidy also impacts the length of
unemployment spells so the 66% gure is not the end of the story.
The rise in the reservation wage is one measure of the subsidy's impact. The subsidy also raises
the likelihood that an individual will accept a job oer. This is illustrated in Figure 4. When we
model reservation wages using reported reservation wages, w (as opposed to wq5 or w
MLE), the
probability of accepting a job oer increases from .30 to about .44 with a subsidy of R1000. This
translates into shorter unemployment spells{presumably the foremost goal of the wage subsidy{
and this is shown in Figure 5. Focusing again on the results that use the reported reservation
wages, w, the fraction of youth who report an unemployment spell of 12 months falls from about
42% with no subsidy to about 27% with a R1000 subsidy. A 15 point reduction in long term
unemployment strikes us as quite sizeable. The reduction is close to 10 percentage points when we
estimate the model without using reservation wages inferred from the 5th percentile of accepted
wages. These percentage point declines carry over to comparable declines in the probability of 24
month unemployment spells, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 5. The model using reported
reservation wages has 25% of individuals reporting a 24 month period of unemployment, and this
falls to about 10% with a R1000 wage subsidy.
Overall, our prospective analysis of an employer wage subsidy indicates that the subsidy will be
eective in reducing unemployment spells, even in a model that generates substantial unemployment
in the absence of such a subsidy. The avenues through which the subsidy works are more subtle than
would be the case in an \Econ 101" model of supply and demand. We nd that the subsidy raises
reservation wages and so, even with an assumed 100% pass-through of the subsidy as it impacts
the wage oer distribution, accepted wages only rise by about 66% of the subsidy. This amount of
pass-through, though, is enough to generate substantial declines in long term unemployment spells.
The fact that all of the impacts of the subsidy illustrated in Figures 3 - 5 are almost linear suggests
that the level of the wage subsidy is mostly a political decision. That is, there are no obvious
28The reservation wage and mean accepted wage increase by the same amount because the entire accepted wage
distribution has shifted to the right by the increase in the reservation wage.
18inection points that would support an argument for a subsidy set at a particular level.
5.2 Caveats
Figure 5 represents our estimate of the impact of a wage subsidy on unemployment spells, but
the model that generates these results is necessarily much simpler than the youth labor market in
metro Cape Town. There are assumptions in both the underlying search model as well as in how
we model the wage subsidy that merit highlighting.
Notably, the partial equilibrium nature of our search model treats labor demand as exogenously
determined and fully described by the Poisson job oer arrival rate and wage oer distribution.
Our model may fail to capture additional idiosyncratic frictions in the South African labor market
that rms and workers face, such as ring restrictions and the lack of a vibrant informal sector.
Moreover, young people may not behave entirely according to the reservation wage policy described
by our simple search model, as the large proportion who accept wages below their stated reservation
wage suggests. The wage subsidy we model may not pass through completely to the wage oer
distribution, as we assume, if rms can exercise market power and capture rents from the subsidy.
Finally, we ignore any possible general equilibrium eects from the wage subsidy: even if targeted
only to the young, youth make up a disproportionate share of South Africa's unemployed, as noted
in the Introduction.
Nonetheless, we believe that our analysis adds to the existing literature and political conversation
about wage subsidies by considering how the subsidy would aect the reservation wages of job
seekers in an environment of equilibrium unemployment. Our analysis of the eects of a wage
subsidy complements those of Pauw and Edwards (2006), Burns et al. (2010) and Go et al. (2010),
who consider wage subsidies in the context of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of the
South African economy and nd positive eects on employment, wages and GDP.
196 Conclusion
Persistently high youth unemployment is one of the most pressing problems in South Africa. The
South African government has proposed an employer wage subsidy to address the issue. We prospec-
tively analyze such a policy. Recognizing that a credible estimate of the policy's impact requires
a model of the labor market that itself generates high unemployment in equilibrium, we estimate
a structural search model that incorporates both observed heterogeneity and measurement error
in wages. We nd that the estimated model replicates the observed unemployment spells and the
distribution of accepted wages reasonably well, although not perfectly. Using the model to examine
the impact of a wage subsidy, we nd benecial eects for youth even after accounting for how the
subsidy increases reservation wages. We nd that a R1000/month wage subsidy paid to employers
leads to more frequent job oer acceptances, increased accepted wages and substantial declines in
even long term unemployment.
This paper is hardly the nal word on this question but rather represents an initial examination
of an important policy option.
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22A Derivation of Likelihood Function
This appendix provides more detail on the derivation and form of the likelihood function used in
model estimation. The likelihood function is composed of two additively separable parts that follow
from the search model: the accepted wage distribution and the unemployment duration distribution.
We consider each in turn:
Accepted wage distribution. Under our assumption that wage oers are distributed exponential(),
the accepted wage distribution is:












Because we also assume that wages are measured with error such that wo = w + , where wo
is the observed accepted wage and  is distributed N(0;2
), we have the following distribution of
observed accepted wages:









































where () is the standard normal distribution, and   = wo   w is the upper bound on the
distribution of .
Unemployment duration distribution. Under our assumption of Poisson oer arrivals, the hazard
of unemployment exit h is the (constant) product of the oer arrival rate q and the probability
that the oer will be accepted, i.e., h = q(1   FW(w)). Accordingly, unemployment durations
d are distributed exponentially with parameter h, so that fD(d) = hexp( hd). Because some
unemployment spells are right-censored, the observed duration d = minfd;dcg, where d is the
true duration and dc is the duration observed when the spell was censored. Let c = Ifd = dcg be
an indicator for censored spells. Then the density of observed unemployment durations, gD(d), is:
gD(d) = fD(d)1 c[1   FD(d)]c
= [hexp( hd)]1 c[exp( hd)]c
Finally, let m = f0;1g be an indicator for missing wage data (either due to a censored un-
employment spell or otherwise). The individual's likelihood contribution is the (log) sum of the
observed accepted wage and unemployment duration densities:
L() = (1   m)lnfW(wojw  w;) + lngD(d;)
23for  = (q;;).
24B Data Denitions
The sample is all young adults in CAPS who began as enrolled students at the inception of the
monthly calendar data (August 2002) but have exited school; are observed for at least 12 months
since leaving school in the monthly calendar data; and have non-missing reservation wage data
(reservation wage measure dened below). Additionally, those below the 1st and above the 99th
percentiles of accepted wages are dropped. School exit is dened as at least 3 consecutive months of
school absence in the calendar data (only 6% report returning to school after a minimum 3-month
absence, none of them full-time). Time is calculated relative to month of school exit, so that month
1 is the rst of the minimum 3 consecutive months of school absence that dene school exit.
Unemployment duration is calculated relative to month of school exit, so that the minimum
unemployment duration is one month. An unemployment spell ends when the youth reports working
in any job in a calendar month, where work is dened as employment for pay, in-kind benets or
\family gain." Censored observations are those that had not completed their rst unemployment
spell by the end of the observation period (December 2006).
The observed wage is the rst reported wage after school exit across Waves 1-4, adjusted for
monthly CPI (base is August 2002, the rst month of calendar data) at the time of interview and
scaled to full-time monthly equivalent based on 160 working hours per month (those reporting
monthly hours above 160 are considered full-time and do not receive an adjustment). Wages
reported in Waves 2-4 are the sum of wages reported across all jobs held.
When the reservation wage is based on survey data, it is the value from the most recent interview
before conclusion of the rst unemployment spell since exiting school. For Wave 1, the reservation
wage w = w
moft, where w
moft is the response to the question, \What is the lowest monthly




revealed is the lowest wage associated with an armative
response to the series of questions, \Would you accept a job doing occupation x at monthly wage w?"
Reservation wages are adjusted for monthly CPI (August 2002 base) at the time of interview. For
those with a censored rst unemployment spell, the reservation wage is the last reported reservation
wage in the panel.
Search is dened as a positive response to the \Searched for work in this month?" question in
the calendar data. The job separation probability is calibrated as total number of separations from
the rst job divided by total months employed in rst job since leaving school for all observations
in the sample.
Age is age in years at school exit. Schooling is years of completed schooling at school exit.
The ability proxy is the z-score from the literacy and numeracy evaluation (LNE) administered by
CAPS in Wave 1. The \previously worked" variable is an indicator for whether the youth worked
for pay (i.e., reported a non-zero wage) in the panel prior to school exit. Full-time work is dened
as an an average of at least 35 hours per month.
The survey weight is the young adult sample weight, which is adjusted for the sample design
plus household and young adult non-response.
25C Tests of Model Fit
This appendix discusses the formal test of model t we use to compare our predicted unemployment
duration and accepted wage distributions to the data. For continuous data, Cameron and Trivedi
(2005, pp. 261-2) propose a variation of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test using the sample
moments and scores from the estimated model.29 Let ^ mi = m(xi; ^ ) be the sample moment(s) for
observation i evaluated at the estimated parameters ^ . For instance, for exponential wage oers
we would have ^ mi = wi   (^  + w). Let ^ si = s(xi; ^ ) = @ lnLi
@^  be the score vector for observation i
evaluated at ^ . Under the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specied, E(m) = E(s) = 0.
Cameron and Trivedi propose the following auxiliary regressions:
1 = ^ m0
i + ^ s0
i + ui
1 = ^ m0
i + ui
where 1 is a vector of ones and the second auxiliary regression is valid in the case where @m
@ = 0,




u is the uncentered R2 from the auxiliary regression. Under the null, M is distributed
2(h), where h is the dimension of m (i.e., h is the number of moments).30
29Although many researchers use the Pearson 2 test to evaluate the t of structural models, Cameron and Trivedi
(2005, pp. 266) note that the test is invalid if the data are not generated from a multinomial distribution. Since our
outcomes of interest (duration and wages) are continuous, we use the LM test described above.
30Another test of model t that could be applied in our context is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is a
nonparametric test for the equality of two distributions. However, when the parameters of one distribution are
estimated using data from the other, the test statistic may not be asymptotically distributed according to the
Kolmogorov distribution, invalidating the test.
26Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
female 1430 0.53 0.50 0 1
black 1430 0.26 0.44 0 1
coloured 1430 0.62 0.49 0 1
white 1430 0.12 0.32 0 1
age 1430 19.5 2.1 14 26
schooling 1430 10.7 2.1 0 16
ability score 1430 0.18 0.91 -2.97 2.01
wage 977 2486.4 1859.9 346.6 11642.3
reservation wage 1430 1594.2 1801.8 48.7 36645.8
I(w
 > w) 977 0.24 0.43 0 1
rst UE spell 1430 11.7 11.2 1 50
UE spell1yr 1430 0.42 0.49 0 1
censor 1430 0.24 0.43 0 1
previously worked 1430 0.34 0.48 0 1
full-time 1027 0.77 0.42 0 1
never searched 1430 0.35 0.48 0 1
return to school (ft) 1430 0.00 0.00 0 0
return to school 1430 0.06 0.23 0 1
Sample is youth who have left school (absent at least 3 consecutive months after attending school at least one month in calendar sample),
observed for at least 12 months in calendar sample after school exit, and with valid reservation wage data. Age and schooling measured
at time of school exit. Ability score is z-score from literacy and numeracy evaluation administered in Wave 1. Wage is first reported wage
following completion of first unemployment spell. Reservation wage is last reported reservation wage before first completed unemployment spell
or censoring. Observations below 1st percentile and above 99th percentile of accepted wages dropped. Wages and reservation wages in real rand
per month, base month August 2002 (South African rand/US dollar exchange rate at base=10.59). I(wr > w) is indicator that reservation wage
exceeds reported accepted wage. Previously worked refers to work experience in calendar history prior to school exit. Full-time is average of at
least 35 hours per week of work in last month. Never searched excludes those who obtain employment immediately after school exit. Statistics
calculated using sample weights (weightyr).
27Table 2: Unemployment, by observable characteristics
First UE spell UE spell1yr UE spell2yrs UE, month 12 censored
male 10.2 0.35 0.23 0.47 0.19
female 13.0 0.49 0.34 0.56 0.28
African 17.2 0.66 0.52 0.72 0.38
coloured 10.2 0.36 0.20 0.48 0.20
white 7.7 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.14
age:
18 13.9 0.50 0.35 0.59 0.33
19-22 10.9 0.39 0.25 0.50 0.20
23 7.4 0.27 0.18 0.34 0.11
schooling:
9 16.3 0.59 0.43 0.70 0.38
10 or 11 12.7 0.48 0.28 0.55 0.28
12 9.2 0.32 0.19 0.42 0.15
>12 5.0 0.15 0.15 0.29 0.07
low ability 14.3 0.54 0.37 0.63 0.31
high ability 8.7 0.29 0.19 0.39 0.16
previously worked 15.1 0.57 0.41 0.66 0.37
never worked before 5.2 0.14 0.05 0.25 0.00
some search 10.2 0.36 0.26 0.47 0.18
never searched 14.5 0.55 0.33 0.61 0.36
Age and schooling measured at time of school exit. \Low" and \high" ability refer to below and above within-sample median literacy and
numeracy evaluation score. \Some search" is reported search in at least one month prior to completion of first UE spell or censoring. \Previously
worked" means work experience reported in calendar history prior to school exit. Never searched excludes those who obtain employment
immediately after school exit. First unemployment spell measured in months; all other statistics are means of indicator variables. \UE, month
12" refers to employment at month 12 following school exit. All statistics weighted by sample weights.




















ability score 281.9 303.8
(74.4)*** (75.9)***






parents want youth to work -79.9
(25.4)***
co-resident with parent 180.8
(79.0)**





Robust standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Reservation wage w
i is individual-
specific survey report, as defined in Appendix B. Age and schooling measured at time of school exit. Pensioner in HH, father employed, ill,
parents want to work, co-resident with parent, and own child in hh variables measured at time of reservation wage, where reservation wage is
last report prior to job acceptance or end of calendar sample. \Ill" refers to self-reported illness that prevents normal activities. \Parents want
youth to work" measured on self-reported 1-5 scale, with 5 being strongest. All regressions include fixed effects for wave at which w measured.
29Table 4: Parameter estimates, using reservation wage survey reports
Parameter lnq ln ln
(oer arrival (wage oer (measurement
rate) parameter) error s.d.)
baseline level 0.27 710.58 495.11






HS grad 0.48 0.27
(0.13) (0.07)
at least some college 0.69 0.54
(0.19) (0.11)
high ability 0.27 0.15
(0.12) (0.07)






 (measurement error s.d.) 0.27
as percentage of observed accepted wage s.d.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimation is by maximum likelihood, with reservation wage as median reservation wage from survey
within covariate cell. Starting values taken from converged estimates of sequential estimation of wage offer and unemployment duration distri-
butions. Optimization algorithm alternates between BFGS and BHHH. \Baseline level" refers to value of exponentiated constant term for each
parameter, and may be interpreted as parameter level for left-out category (white high school dropouts of low ability, with no previous work
experience). Pr(w  w) calculated as mean over distribution of full sample, i.e., Pr(w  w) =
R
Pr(w  wjx)f(x)dx.






lnq (oer arrival rate): baseline 0.27 0.07 0.15
constant -1.30 -2.64 -1.88
(0.29) (0.20) (0.24)
black -0.80 -0.51 -0.74
(0.32) (0.20) (0.23)
coloured -0.40 -0.12 -0.33
(0.26) (0.18) (0.19)
HS grad 0.48 0.54 0.43
(0.13) (0.09) (0.13)
at least some college 0.69 0.92 0.73
(0.19) (0.18) (0.20)
high ability 0.27 0.25 0.10
(0.12) (0.10) (0.13)
previous work 0.37 1.13 0.78
(0.12) (0.09) (0.12)
ln (wage oer parameter): baseline 710.58 1445.88 899.51
constant 6.57 7.28 6.80
(0.17) (0.15) (0.12)
black -0.32 -0.53 -0.33
(0.19) (0.16) (0.13)
coloured -0.13 -0.34 -0.17
(0.15) (0.13) (0.10)
HS grad 0.27 0.22 0.27
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
at least some college 0.54 0.49 0.55
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
high ability 0.15 0.11 0.20
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
previous work 0.73 0.41 0.61
(0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
ln (measurement error s.d.): baseline 495.11 262.09 322.73


















N 1430 1430 1430
lnL -1,055,884 -1,055,534 -1,052,301
Pr(w  w
) 0.29 0.59 0.44
 (measurement error s.d.) 0.27 0.14 0.17
as percentage of observed accepted wage s.d.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reservation wages at top row refer to inputs of maximum likelihood estimation: w is median reservation
wage from data; wq5 is 5th percentile reservation wage; and w
MLE is maximum likelihood estimate (all by cell defined by included covariates).
Estimation is by maximum likelihood, with starting values taken from converged estimates of sequential estimation of wage offer and unemploy-
ment duration distributions. Optimization algorithm alternates between BFGS and BHHH. \Baseline" refers to value of exponentiated constant
term for each parameter, and may be interpreted as parameter level for left-out category (white high school dropouts of low ability, with no
previous work experience). Pr(w  w) calculated as mean over distribution of full sample, i.e., Pr(w  w) =
R
Pr(w  wjx)f(x)dx.
31Table 6: Empirical and predicted unemployment survivor functions
Pr(d  d0)






3 0.69 0.75 0.75 0.75
6 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.60
12 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.42
24 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.25
36 0.04 0.15 0.16 0.16

2 424.7 399.3 430.7
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Each cell reports value of survivor function at UE duration in left-hand column, i.e., each cell gives the proportion of the unemployment duration
distribution that is at least as great as the value in the left-hand column. Column (1) is empirical survivor function observed in the sample,
while columns (2)-(4) give predicted survival function for models using the indicator reservation wage inputs. 2 statistic is from auxiliary
regression of ones on sample moments; statistic is NR2 from this regression, and is distributed 2(m), where m = 1 is the number of moments;
see Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 261-2). Appendix C describes this test in greater detail.
Table 7: Moments and quantiles of empirical and predicted accepted wage distributions
Accepted wage





mean 2486.4 2346.4 2336.0 2295.2
(std. dev.) (1859.9) (1356.6) (1682.5) (1529.5)
quantiles
0.1 902.0 886.9 709.6 866.6
0.25 1299.9 1341.2 1087.4 1224.6
0.5 1835.2 1969.7 1760.6 1789.8
0.75 3108.0 2899.8 2915.4 2753.2
0.9 4961.0 4278.9 4676.0 4282.1

2 221.7 204.0 196.8
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Each cell reports corresponding moment or quantile of observed accepted wages for empirical wage distribution (column 1) and predicted wage
distribution by reservation wage input used in model estimation (columns 2-4). 2 statistic is from auxiliary regression of ones on sample
moments; statistic is NR2 from this regression, and is distributed 2(m), where m = 1 is the number of moments; see Cameron and Trivedi
(2005, p. 261-2). Appendix C describes this test in greater detail.
32Figure 1: Wages and reservation wages
Full-time equivalent wages based on 160 hours of work per month.
33Figure 2: Density of accepted wages and rst unemployment spell
(a)
(b)
34Figure 3: Reservation wages and accepted wages under employer wage subsidy
(a)
(b)
35Figure 4: Probability of oer acceptance under employer wage subsidy
36Figure 5: Unemployment survivor function under employer wage subsidy: 12 and 24-month UE
spell
(a)
(b)
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